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Retrieval of Infotainment System Artifacts
from Vehicles Using iVe
Celia J. Whelan*, B.A., B.S.; John E. Sammons, M.S.; Brian K. McManus; Terry Fenger, Ph.D.

Abstract
The analysis of mobile devices and hard drives has been the focus of the digital forensics
world for years, but there is another source of potential evidence not often considered: vehicles.
Many of today’s “connected cars” have systems that function like computers, storing information
they process including user data from devices synced to the system. There has been little to no
research done regarding what types of user artifacts can be found on the system, how long these
artifacts remain, whether or not the user can remove those artifacts, and whether certain systems
provide more information than others. For this study, two different makes and models of vehicle
infotainment systems were used for data acquisition: a Uconnect® system and a Toyota™
Extension Box. It was found that the Toyota™ system provided a significant amount of user
information (contacts, call logs, media file information, and locations), while the Uconnect®
system provided only locations. This indicates valuable user data can be obtained in this manner.

Introduction
More commonly thought of sources for digital evidence are computer hard drives, mobile
devices (cell phones, tablets, iPods, etc.), or gaming devices (Wii, Xbox, PlayStation, etc.), but
vehicles may also be potential containers for a large quantity of valuable digital evidence [2, 3].
Recently, modern vehicles have transformed from machines of transportation to “computers on
wheels,” containing built-in storage, Wi-Fi connectivity, satellite radio, syncing capabilities, and
the ability to communicate with other vehicles and/or infrastructures. A vehicle possessing some
combination of these features, in the form of an infotainment system, is referred to as a “Connected
Car” [3]. An infotainment system is formally defined as:
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A factory original or aftermarket console system that uses some form of connectivity to
provide drivers and passengers with vehicle specific information, navigation, and
standalone or integrated applications and/or multimedia entertainment including audio and
video [3].
In other words, an infotainment system is a combination of GPS, Bluetooth sync, satellite radio,
Wi-Fi, etc. The system can have some combination of the aforementioned capabilities, or it can
have other connection capabilities that were not previously mentioned [16]. The infotainment
system is what stores any of the user data that may be transferred during a syncing process with a
device and/or infrastructure, such as satellites, the Internet, and mobile devices, among others.
That stored data can either be vehicle event data (brakes applied, gear changes, connections
to or disconnections from Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, etc.), navigation data (saved or recent locations,
trackpoints, etc.), or user data (call logs, SMS messages, social media feeds, etc.) [4]. The field of
vehicle forensics encompasses collecting and analyzing these types of vehicle data and the
evidence obtained can prove just as useful in crimes involving vehicles as other types of digital
evidence can in other crimes [4, 5]. The problem is that vehicle forensics is not commonly utilized
because it is such a new field that attorneys, investigators, and law enforcement may not even
realize the wealth of digital information cars can provide.
As these connected cars become more prevalent and more connected, there will likely be a
rise in the number of digital crimes targeting vehicles, such as vehicle hacking or the use of vehicle
malware. The potential for vehicle forensics to recover digital information from vehicle systems
attacked in these types of crimes makes vehicle forensics that much more valuable. Further, as
mobile phones collect and retain more and more personal information, manufacturers and
developers are increasing the security that is placed on those mobile phones. This means the
passcodes are harder to crack, the encryption is harder to decode, and thus the information stored
on them is more difficult to access. But, by using Berla Corporation’s iVe, a vehicle forensics tool,
it should be possible to retrieve mobile phone user data from a vehicle if that mobile phone has
been previously synced with the vehicle. It should be possible to retrieve mobile phone data from
a vehicle if that phone has been previously synced with the vehicle, even if that mobile phone was
password-protected and the encryption was turned on [4, 13, 14]. What many do not realize is that
when the vehicle’s system is used to make phone calls or send text messages, not only is that
information stored in the phone and phone logs but on the vehicle infotainment system’s hard drive
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as well. This means it could actually be easier and less time-consuming to recover mobile phone
data from a vehicle system than to recover similar data from the mobile phone itself [4, 13]. Thus,
user data obtained in this manner has the potential to serve as valuable evidence in cases involving
vehicles both now and in the future.
Not only can user data (e.g. texts, browsing history.) potentially be retrieved from a
vehicle’s infotainment system, but other artifacts may also be found on the infotainment system
and can greatly assist law enforcement. Both vehicle event data (e.g. the car doors opening/closing
or the car’s gear state) and navigation data (e.g. GPS locations) have been previously used in court
as evidence in both homicide and home invasion cases [4], and user data has the potential to serve
as valuable evidence in future cases.
But obtaining user data artifacts from vehicle systems is not a simple task. Law
enforcement and digital forensic examiners must go into the system themselves and acquire the
necessary data; this is possible using iVe [4]. iVe is a proprietary tool developed by Berla
Corporation and it is the only commercially available tool for vehicle forensics. While iVe is
relatively new, the software is already stated to support data acquisition from the infotainment and
telematics systems of over 4,600 models of vehicles [4, 14, 18]. iVe provides a vehicle lookup
function, so as to allow the user to enter the year, make, model, trim, and style of the vehicle to
determine whether a vehicle is supported by the tool. A vehicle’s VIN (Vehicle Identification
Number) can also be used to determine compatibility [4].
Acquisition of this user data from all of the various supported models can become
complicated because all of the models of vehicle are different; thus, the acquisition method varies
by the make and model of car. Once the specifics of the vehicle have been entered into iVe, detailed
instructions are provided for identification of parts and ports, disassembly (if necessary), and
acquisition [4]. If disassembly is required, it is detailed in such a way that the pieces should be
able to be reassembled to its original condition [4, 14].
When iVe is used to acquire data from an infotainment system, either a logical or physical
acquisition can be performed, which will depend on the infotainment system. Additionally, either
a partial image (user data ONLY) or full image (all of the possible data) can be obtained.
Regardless of the type of acquisition obtained using iVe, the acquired file can then be analyzed
using iVe as well [4, 14]. The analyst can then view the information, search, bookmark, and graph
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it, as well as generate a report, just as is done in other more well-known computer forensic tools
such as Forensic Toolkit or Encase [4].
Berla Corporation states that iVe is capable of recovering user artifacts such as call logs,
SMS messages, and connected devices [4, 14, 15, 18], but to the knowledge of the researchers,
user data obtained in this manner has not been used in any adjudicated court cases to date.
Additionally, there is little to no documentation regarding the amount of historical user data cached
by the various infotainment systems. The amount of user data recoverable from the system and its
age is a crucial aspect for law enforcement officers and investigators to be aware of. If this method
of data acquisition proves successful and can give an indication of historical data on the vehicle
system it could be a great asset to the law enforcement and forensic science communities.

Research Questions and Hypothesis
It is the belief of the researchers that user data artifacts left on vehicles from the use of
mobile phones and infotainment systems may provide valuable forensically relevant digital
evidence. Additionally, it is the goal of this research to make law enforcement aware of the
potential information that vehicle forensics may uncover. The following are the questions this
research aims to address:

1. What user data artifacts are left behind on vehicles from the syncing of mobile phones to
the vehicle’s infotainment system?
2. Which of those artifacts may prove forensically relevant to law enforcement forensic
investigations?
3. Do some infotainment systems yield a greater number of artifacts or types of artifacts than
other systems?
4. How persistent are the artifacts?
a. Are user artifacts deleted when the phone is “un-synced” or unpaired from the
vehicle via the on-screen interface?
b. Are user artifacts deleted when the “Remove User Data” function present in certain
systems is used?

Materials and Methods
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In order to determine what mobile phone user data was recoverable from vehicle
infotainment systems, data needed to be available on the systems so that researchers could note
the general numbers and types of artifacts present. A generalized research protocol was developed
outlining the various unpairings, data removal processes, and data acquisitions that were to be
performed. This protocol was based on various published guidelines and manuals but the actual
acquisitions of user data from the vehicle infotainment systems were performed as per the iVe
instructions. Any acquired data was then analyzed using iVe and compared.

Test Vehicle Selection
In order to use iVe to acquire user data, a compatible vehicle and infotainment system
needed to be identified. In order to narrow down the list of potential candidate vehicles to a
manageable number, it was necessary to narrow down the options to only vehicles that did not
require disassembly and could be acquired using only a USB port. Based on this “USB only”
criteria, a 2013 Dodge Dart Limited with a Uconnect 8.4 infotainment system and a 2013 Toyota
Highlander Limited with a Toyota Extension Box system were chosen. The procedures outlined
in the following section were followed for the syncing and acquisition processes performed on the
two systems.

General Research Protocol for Device Sync and Data Acquisition
For this project, a general method for the syncing and acquisition processes was developed
and followed using the SWGDE “Best Practices for Vehicle Infotainment and Telematics
Systems” [19] as general guidelines, in conjunction with the iVe user manual provided with the
iVe software. This protocol was to be followed during all processes over the course of the project.
The overarching pattern of the processes used in the research protocol is outlined below. The
acquisition procedure details specific to each system are not described in this article as they are
specific to the iVe software and only accessible with the software license.
Below, Table 2 indicates each phase of the research protocol and its objective while Figure
1 provides a visual depiction of the phase order and what occurs during each phase.

Table 2. Each acquisition phase of the research protocol and its corresponding objective.
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Acquisition

Objective

Baseline

Determine what data is on the system

Unpair/“Un-sync”
“Remove Personal Data”

Determine if/what data is made unrecoverable upon
phone removal through on-screen interface
Determine if/what data is made unrecoverable upon use of
“Remove Personal Data” function

Figure 1. Visual depiction of phase order and what occurs in each phase.

Prior to any syncing taking place, a “baseline” acquisition of the infotainment system was
performed to account for anything present on the system prior to our accessing the system.
Following the baseline acquisition, any previously paired devices were removed from the system
using the on-screen interface and another acquisition performed. Looking at this image, in
conjunction with the baseline images, deduction of the user data left behind on the system upon
device unpairing should be possible. It should be noted that in systems that contained a “Remove
Personal Data” option, the option was selected and data was acquired again.
All of the acquisitions done on the two systems were performed using a Dell Latitude
E6500 Laptop with 4 GB of RAM running Windows 8.1 Enterprise (64-bit). The version of iVe
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used was 1.8.4. Additionally, all acquisitions were stored on a Western Digital My Passport Ultra
1 TB external hard drive.

System Specific Information
2013 Dodge Dart
The 2013 Dodge Dart Limited contained a Uconnect
8.4 infotainment system, referred to as “the system” in this
section. Prior to any data acquisition, a visual examination was
performed. Following this, a baseline image was acquired.
This was done by placing the system in “dealer mode” and
transferring the user data to a PNY 64 GB USB 3.0 flash drive.
This resulted in a userdata.pas file, or a Uconnect Panasonic
Binary file, which was imported into the iVe tool and
processed. Importing this data into iVe was classified as a
logical, “import” acquisition type. Once imported and
processed, a case was created for the acquisition so that
analysis could be performed. Hashing and indexing were

Figure 2. Uconnect 8.4 infotainment
system of a 2013 Dodge Dart Limited.

allowed to finish prior to analysis.

2013 Toyota Highlander Limited
The 2013 Toyota Highlander Limited infotainment
system had a Toyota extension box, which will be referred
to as “the system” in this section. Again, prior to any data
acquisition, a visual examination was performed. This was
followed by the acquisition of a system baseline acquisition
using the iVe USB acquisition kit. Once the data was
collected, a case was created for the acquired data so that it
could be analyzed, and hashing and indexing were allowed
to complete prior to analysis of the data; this was done for
each acquisition. Next, all paired devices were unpaired oneby-one from the system. Following the removal of all paired
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devices, data was acquired again. It was noted that the Toyota system had an option labeled “delete
personal data”; this option was not noted on the previous Uconnect system. The “delete personal
data” button was selected and a final data acquisition was performed.

Results & Discussion
2013 Dodge Dart Limited
It was noted upon visual examination that there were three previously paired devices
visibly listed on the system screen. Other than device names, there was no further user information
available on the infotainment system screen. Upon analysis of the baseline acquisition and viewing
of the generated report, it was seen that there were no attached devices, text messages (SMS), call
log entries, or contacts identified and acquired by the iVe software. The only relevant information
obtained from the Uconnect 8.4 system was a list of addresses from locations listed in the system.
These addresses were also listed with their corresponding geolocation data (latitude and longitude).

2013 Toyota Highlander Limited
Upon visual examination of the infotainment system, it was noted that there were three
foreign (or non-test) devices listed on the screen as paired with the system. Aside from the names
of the devices, there was no user information available from the infotainment system screen. Upon
analysis of the acquired baseline data, there were 13 devices listed, 3 of which were those that had
been noted on the system’s screen. For each of those 3 devices, there were hundreds of contacts
and call logs obtained by iVe. It was noted that call logs as far back as three years (2013) could be
seen in the recovered data. One of the devices was only listed with its corresponding phone version,
but the other two were listed with their International Mobile Station Equipment Identities (IMEIs)
and one even listed the user’s unique number Apple ID. IMEIs are important to note as they are
unique numbers that identify mobile and satellite phones, giving an indication of who may own
the device. For the other 10 devices, information about 22 media files was found, as well as more
contacts and call logs under a device labeled “UNKNOWN.” Information about the 22 media files
was from 2 different devices (11 from each device) and they were all listed as audio files. The
types of artifacts found on the system and the total number of items for each type can be found
below in Table 3. All of the data acquired from the test vehicles was deleted after examination and
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analysis. This was done in order to maintain the privacy of the individuals whose data was synced
with these systems.
Table 3. Type and total number of artifacts found on the background system image.

Artifact Type

Number of Records

Devices

13

Contacts

1,347

Calls Logged

603

Media

22

Locations & Addresses

18

It should be noted that 6 of the 13 devices observed from the acquired baseline data
appeared to be installed by the iVe software. It was concluded that no write blocker was
incorporated into the iVe hardware that was used for acquisition since writes were made to the
system and no user artifacts were found to be associated with these 6 devices. This can be of
concern in the forensics community because, without write blockers, writes to the system can be
made, which can be considered as altering the evidence. This can be problematic in a courtroom
setting as it raises the question “If the system was knowingly altered, could the incriminating
evidence have not also been placed on the system?” Fortunately, almost all of the data acquired
from the infotainment systems is time/date-stamped. This allows the analyst to see what the
acquisition process affected and which artifacts were added by the software. In addition, detailed
notes kept by the analyst can assist in identifying what data the processes affected.
Even though writes were made to the system during acquisition, this does not discount the
forensic value of this type of digital evidence. This is demonstrated by the fact that mobile phone
evidence is frequently used in court and writes are made to the phone systems during some mobile
phone extractions and examinations. By keeping meticulous notes and documenting exactly what
was done, evidence integrity may be maintained. So while the lack of write blocking is a definite
downside to digital evidence obtained by iVe in this manner, it does not appear to diminish its
value when explained properly; this cannot be said with any degree of certainty though, as more
research is required. In this case, no signs of compromised data were detected but future work
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would be required to help determine whether the lack of write blocking compromised the forensic
value or soundness of the evidence.
Following the analysis of the baseline acquisition data, the data acquired after the on-screen
removal of the three devices originally listed on-screen was analyzed. There were still 13 devices
noted in the data collected although devices were no longer listed on the screen of the infotainment
system. Again, 6 of the 13 devices were noted to have been placed there by the use of the
acquisition software. Media file information for all 22 media files was retained on the system, as
were the 18 locations and addresses, as well as their associated latitude and longitude.
Additionally, the two devices that had originally listed their IMEIs no longer displayed their
IMEIs, though the unique number Apple ID was still present. There were still contacts and call
logs listed, but the number present was smaller than what was noted in the previous data set and
the items were no longer listed according to their associated device. In terms of numbers, the total
number of contacts dropped from the previously noted 1,347 to 819, while the total number of
calls logged stayed consistent at 603. This means that the contacts and call logs were not removed
or deleted from the system after the device was unpaired or “un-synced” from the system and that
instead they were all marked as being from an “UNKNOWN” device. This is good news because
it means that this type of user information cannot be easily removed from the system by the user.
All of these artifacts left behind have the ability to prove extremely valuable to investigators as
they search for suspects or witnesses and can also help them corroborate or disprove someone’s
alibi. While the media/audio file information found on this system may not seem relevant in this
case, their presence may point to the ability of analysts to recover information regarding other
media files such as videos or pictures, which could prove relevant in some types of cases.
The last data acquisition on the system was performed after the “Remove Personal Data”
option was selected on the system. Upon analysis of this data, it was determined that the only data
type made unrecoverable when the “Remove Personal Data” option is used is the locations and
addresses stored on the system. This means that by removing a device from the system and
selecting the “remove personal data” option, only the user’s locations or addresses entered into
navigation are made unrecoverable, along with phone IMEI. Other than that, the rest of the data
appears to remain recoverable. Table 4 below shows this in simplified form and compares the
noted artifacts from before and after selection of the “remove personal data” option.
Table 4. Comparison of recovered artifacts on the Toyota Extension Box before and after “Remove Personal Data”
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Before “Remove Personal Data”

After “Remove Personal Data”

Devices (IMEI, Phone version, Unique

Devices (Phone version, Unique

number Apple ID, Last sync)

number Apple ID, Last sync)

Contacts (Name, Phone Number, Email)
Artifacts
Found

Contacts (Name, Phone Number,
email)

Call logs

Call logs

Media (Audio Files)

Media (Audio files)

Locations & Addresses (latitude and
longitude)
13 Devices (0 noted on-screen)

13 Devices (0 noted on-screen)

819 Contacts

819 Contacts

603 Calls logged

603 Calls logged

22 Media files

22 Media Files

Total
Number
of
Records

18 Locations

It is possible that when the “Remove Personal Data” option was used, the locations and
addresses artifacts were not removed but rather placed in unallocated space. This means the
artifacts would still be on the system but there is nothing in the file system that points to that data
location. It may be that the iVe software cannot find the “removed” data when a logical acquisition
is performed since a logical acquisition only recovers data that is part of the file system, akin to
what happens when someone “deletes” files and information on computer hard drives. In terms of
a computer hard drive, a physical acquisition of the data may recover “deleted” data but a logical
acquisition cannot; this may also hold true in the case of vehicle forensics.

Comparison
In looking at artifacts recovered from each system, it is clear that more forensically relevant
data was obtained from the Toyota Extension Box than from the Uconnect system. The Toyota
system provided devices, contacts, call logs, audio files, and locations, while the Uconnect system
provides only locations. Table 5 below provides a side-by-side comparison of the artifacts
recovered from each of the two systems, as well as the total number of each recovered type.
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Table 5. Comparison of artifacts found stored on infotainment systems prior to personal data removal.

System

2013 Dodge® Dart Limited

2013 Toyota™ Highlander Limited

Uconnect® 8.4 system

Toyota™ Extension Box system
Devices

On-screen Devices
Contacts (Name, Phone Number, Email)
Artifacts
Found

Call logs
Locations & Addresses/Routes

Media (Audio Files)

(With latitude and longitude)

Locations & Addresses (with latitude
and longitude)

3 On-screen devices
Total

13 Devices (3 noted on-screen)
1,347 Contacts

53 Locations

Number of

603 Calls logged

Records

22 Media files
50 Addresses/Routes
18 Locations

As indicated, the Toyota system clearly provides more types of artifacts in comparison to
the Uconnect system of the Dodge. But keep in mind that when the user has completed as much
personal data removal as they possibly can on both systems, there will be locations and addresses
left on the Dodge Uconnect system, while there will be user information such as call logs, contacts,
and media files left on the Toyota Extension Box system. From this it can be concluded that the
Toyota system provides more user-specific artifacts than the Dodge system. And while on the
surface it may look like the Toyota system provides more digital evidence in general, when it really
comes down to it both systems provide artifacts that could be valuable in a forensic investigation.
While both systems contain relevant digital evidence in varying quantities, the data
acquisition time on each system varies drastically. As mentioned in the materials and methods
section, the Dodge Uconnect system data acquisition was an import acquisition – where the user
data was first transferred to a USB device before being imported into iVe for case creation,
processing, and analysis. This process resulted in a 1.43 MB file, which required 15 seconds to
transfer and 4 seconds to import. For the Toyota system though, a logical data acquisition was
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performed. Each acquisition yielded a file 2.18-2.25 MB in size and took anywhere from
approximately 13 to 16 minutes to complete. This acquisition time differential is reasonable though
since the acquisitions performed on the Toyota system were full file system extractions, while
those on the Dodge system were user data only. Additionally, the sheer number of artifacts
obtained from the Toyota system is much greater than that obtained from the Dodge system and
likely takes longer to acquire; this is supported by the notable difference in acquisition file sizes.

Conclusions
Based on the projected proliferation of connected cars and the type of data they contain,
there is a clear need for vehicle forensics. Projections from the automotive industry indicate that
the number of connected cars sold is expected to rise significantly over the next two years. Statista
estimates that 98% of new cars sold in 2020 will be able to connect to the internet. That same study
predicts that number will rise to 100% by the year 2025 [20].
This research aimed to address four things: which user artifacts can be found on vehicle
infotainment systems; which of those artifacts could be useful to law enforcement; whether any of
those artifacts remain on the system once the devices are removed through the on-screen interface;
and whether different infotainment systems allow for recovery of different artifacts. This study
showed that devices, contacts, call logs, and media files, as well as locations and addresses could
be obtained from the two different infotainment systems inspected. And all of the types of artifacts
recovered during this study could prove valuable to investigators and law enforcement officers.
As it was a goal of this research to demonstrate to the law enforcement and forensic science
communities the need for vehicle forensics and the potential evidence that it can recover, this is an
important conclusion. Additionally, it was seen that even after the user attempts to “clean” the
infotainment system and remove all personal data, artifacts remained that could aid in the
identification of an individual. Finally, in comparing the artifacts that were recovered from the two
systems used in this study, it was established that different systems allow different artifacts to be
recovered.
One concern to note is that because only certain iVe acquisition kits come with a write
blocker – meaning that only certain types of acquisitions permit the blocking of writes – none of
the acquisitions performed in this study used a write blocker, as it was not permitted by the
extraction kits. This is clear, as the iVe software introduced 6 of the 13 devices listed on the Toyota
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system during acquisition. This is of concern in the forensics community because without write
blockers writes to the system can be made, thus altering the evidence. Fortunately, almost all of
the data acquired from the infotainment systems is time/date-stamped, which allows the analyst to
see what the acquisition process affected and which artifacts were added by the software. Even
though writes were made to the system, this does not discount ability of this type of digital evidence
being used in court. In light of this though, the acquisitions in this study bear repeating while using
a write-blocking software in order to observe whether this has any effect on the data obtained.
With vehicle forensics being such a new and cutting-edge field, it has yet to reach its full
potential. But with the number of connected cars only increasing, the amount of digital evidence
that could be contained by vehicles will increase accordingly. With more research, vehicle
forensics has the ability to play a major role in the future of digital forensics and could become
one of the most useful mechanisms for the collection of digital evidence.
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